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PLATFORM MARKET SHARE OF KOREAN ONLINE GAME 
UNDER TWO-SIDED MARKET WITH LOW SWITCHING COSTS 
SeonJun Kang, School of Business, Hanyang University, Seoul, Korea, Socratic7@nate.com 





Online game is one of the fastest growing industries in Korea. It accounts for 5.8% of the world game 
market and one third of the world online game market. Korea’s online game market has two-sided 
market characteristic with very low switching costs. This paper is to study the various characteristics 
of two-sided market under low switching costs. We empirically investigate network externalities by 
using various variables in online game industry in Korea. We found the number of games available in 
a platform increased its market share, while the diversity of games and generality of games had no 
significant impacts. We also found that multi-homing increases an online platform’s market share 
when it is relatively new, but decreases market share when it becomes mature. 
 




The global game market size is estimated at about US$ 85 billion as of 2010, which is 0.2% bigger 
than the previous year. Market shares of game industry are 39.8% for video game, 27.7% for arcade 
game, 18.8% for online game, 10.1% for mobile game, and 3.6% for PC game. While the total game 
market size growth is slowed down and the arcade game industry started to shrink, the online game is 
increasing dramatically, attaining 26.5% growth rate for 2010.  
In Korea, the game market size in 2010 is estimated about US$ 6.5 billion which has grown by 12.9% 
from 2009. Korea’s online game is so popular, so the size is about US$ 4 billion, which is 64.2% of 
total game industry. Game market size and online game market size are anticipated in 2013 about 
US$ 9 billion and US$ 7 billion, respectively. From a standpoint of sale, the game market in Korea 
(US$ 4.95 billion) accounts for 5.8% of the world game market and almost one third of the world 
online game market. Its growth rate is higher than the world game industry growth rate (Korea 
Creative Contents Agency 2011). Therefore, online game is one of the fastest growing industries in 
Korea. 
Online game industry in Korea has the characteristics of two-sided market because online game 
platforms have two distinct user groups (gamers and game developers) that provide each other with 
network benefits. Until late 1990’s, almost all online game developing firms had their own online 
game access portals. However, new type of online game portals that do not necessarily belong to game 
developing firms such as www.netmarble.net andwww.hangame.com began to change the whole 
system. Through these portals, end users can play online games with just one ID, which is so 
convenient. Some portals became famous because they provided the access to many popular games. 
Now, it became the norm for end users to access to the games through complex online game portals. 
Game developers want to provide their games to online game platforms with large number of 
members in order to attract more users. Also, users want to visit the online game platforms which have 
more popular games. Therefore, Korean online game industry now has two-sided market structure. 
China is one of the few countries that have very similar online game structure as Korea. Contrarily, 
US online game does not have Korean style game platforms, as a gamer directly goes to each game 
site. 
However, there is one big difference between Korean online game industry and other typical two-
sided markets. The switching costs for end users are very low. For example, in video game console, 
users incur significant cost for switching from one console system to another because of the hardware 
costs and other inconveniences. Similarly, in smart phone OS system, another good example of two-
sided market, if a user wants to change from iOS to Android, he or she needs to pay a substantial price 
to buy a new smartphone. Contrarily, the switching cost in Korean online game is relatively low, 
because no hardware prices are involved. Just signing up for a new portal enables a user to switch.  
This paper wants to study the various characteristics of two-sided market under low switching cost. 
We empirically investigate network externalities by using various variables in online game industry in 
Korea. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we overview the literatures to 
differentiate our work from previous studies. Given the relatively novel research context, we then 
describe our hypotheses in Section 3. In Section 4, we outline the details of our model and data to help 
make the problem more concrete. Section 5 is to present and discuss the empirical results followed by 
the concluding remarks in Section 6.   
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW & RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
Since Katz and Shapiro (1985)’s study, network externalities have been one of the popular topics in 
the researches on IT industry. For instance, customers used to prefer IBM-compatible PC’s to Apple 
computers because of their large number of users and applications. Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) 
asserted that price of spread-sheet-software was higher when it was Lotus compatible due to strong 
direct network externalities. Also, Gallaugher and Wang (2002) argued that there were network effects 
in web server pricing in software markets.  
The recent researches on indirect network externalities have been developed into “two-sided market.” 
Two-sided markets are defined as markets in which one or several platforms enable interactions 
between two (or multiple) sides on board by appropriately charging each side (Rochet and Tirole 
2006). For example, in credit card industry, credit card companies try to increase their credit card 
members making as many contracts as possible with many merchants. Also, in mobile OS platform 
market such as iOS and Android, OS companies attract end users by inviting many application 
developers to their OS platform. Therefore, the ability to attract many complementary goods and 
manage complementary goods network is as important as the ability to provide excellent products. 
(Cusumano and Gawer 2002; Srinivasan and Venkatraman 2010). 
Early studies on two-sided market focused on the impact of one group’s network size on the other 
group. For example, Gandal et al. (2000) studied the relationship between the sale of CD players and 
the number of available compact disk titles. Bakos and Katsamakas(2008) suggested a pricing model 
in two-sided markets. Clements and Ohashi (2005) and Prieger and Hu (2006) looked into the link 
between the sale of video game consoles and the number of available game titles. As the study 
proceeded, researchers started to consider not only the quantitative measures but also qualitative 
measures like multi-homing1 or complementary good's characteristics (Landsman and Stremersch 
2011), Srinivasan and Venkatraman 2010). They assert that multi-homing has negative effect for 
platform market share, but Choi (2010) assert that multi-homing increases social welfare.  
Until now, the most of the studied two-sided markets have one common characteristic; high switching 
costs between platforms. Users incur a lot of costs to switch from one platform to another. This is true 
for video game console, smartphone OS, and others. Therefore, network effects interact with lock-in 
effects. If researchers do not explicitly consider the switching costs in their empirical model, the 
results might be biased toward incumbents. Contrarily, in online game industry in Korea, switching 
costs among platforms are almost negligible. We believe that this provides the condition that pure 
indirect network externalities between gamers and game developers can be studied. 
 
3 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
In the researches for video game industry, Coughlan (2001) asserts that the number of games available 
for a console determines the greater part of a company profit. Similarly, in online game industry, the 
number of available games titles in an online game platform attracts more end users and increases 
market share for the company. In other words, the network size of the game developers is positively 
                                              
1Multi-homing situation means that platform user can use more than one platform in the user network. On the contrary, 
single-homing situation means that platform users can only use one platform. (Landsman and Stremersch 2011) Therefore in 
single-homing situation, platform provider can monopolize the market but in multi-homing situation, platform providers have 
to compete intensely with each other for platform users 
impact the network size of users. Therefore, to see the indirect network externalities, we posit the 
following hypothesis. 
 
H1: The number of games on a platform has positive impact on its market share. 
 
However, the simple number of games may not truly reflect the various preferences of end users. For 
those who love action games, the number of board games means almost nothing, no matter how big it 
is. Therefore, we need to consider the quality aspect of the network size of the games. Following 
Tanriverdi and Lee (2008), we use the number of genres available in a platform. In Korea, online 
game companies have developed from (Massive Multiplayer Online Role Playing Game (MMORPG) 
and Real Time Strategy Simulation (RTS) to various genres such as sports, racing, and First-person 
shooter (FPS). Therefore, genre is to capture the variety of the game titles in a platform. 
We also need to consider the age restrictions allowed for the games. In general, online game is 
regarded as an entertainment for young people, and the majority of young people play online games 
(age 10~12: 87%, age 12~15: 95%, 15~18: 93%). In Korea, the age rating is arranged by Korea Media 
Rating Board (KMRB). They consider rating in relation to various factors such as violence, sexuality, 
etc. The lower the age rating is, the more people can play the game, and attract more users. Therefore, 
rating is to capture the generality of the game titles in a platform. To see the qualitative aspects of 
games titles, we assert H2 and H3 as follow. 
 
H2: The variety of game genre on a platform has positive impact on its market share. 
 
H3: The greater the number of younger user who can legally play games on a platform, the bigger its 
market share will be. 
 
In prior researches on two-sided markets, single-homing was considered as a differentiation or 
monopolization strategy for platforms. Podlny and Stuart (1995) assert that multi-homing would 
induce competition and thereby negative affect the survival of firms, if they do have similar features. 
Srinivasan and Venkatraman (2010) also assert that games that can be played more than one console 
have negative impacts on sales of console. On the other hand, however, multi-homing is not 
necessarily bad. If the platform can provide popular games which have been serviced on other 
platforms, it would be a useful to attract new users to the platform. Choi (2010) asserts that it is better 
to lead the market to multi-homing from single-homing for efficiency and social welfare. To check 
which argument is correct for Korea’s online game market, we claim H4 as follows. 
 
H4: The greater the number of games which can be played on more than one platform, the larger the 
platform market share will be. 
 
The online game platform firms want to host popular games to increase their market shares. Due to 
this kind of efforts, platform firms make contracts with popular developers and host various kinds of 
games from those popular developers. Therefore, it is worthwhile to analyze the impact of relationship 
between online game developers and platform companies on platform market share. In terms of graph 
theory and network analysis, this is a connection with high centrality vertex, which should have 
positive impacts. This issue has been researched previously by Oliver (1990), Podgorny (2001) and 
Srinivasan and Venkatraman (2010). We adopt measuring method of Srinivasan and Venkatraman 
(2010), and try to see how much online game platform relies on famous game developers. Hence we 
posit the following hypothesis. 
 
H5: Having relationship with popular online game developers will increase the market share of an 
online platform. 
 
Finally, we are going to analyze the moderation effect of platform age on H4. In indirect network 
externality studies, Landsman and Stremersch (2011) assert that the effect of multi-homing varies 
according to maturity of a company. They show that multi-homing negatively affects early platforms, 
but has positive impact on mature platforms. Also, Srinivasan and Venkatraman (2010) argue that 
platform age affects as a moderator for the centrality of complementors. In the online game industry, 
similar effects might exist. Therefore, the effect of multi-homing on a platform may vary according to 
the level of the platform maturity. Accordingly, we suggest following hypothesis. 
 
H6: Platform age has negative moderation effects on H4. 
 
4 RESEARCH METHOD & DATA 
4.1 Research Model 
We use the following regression equation model, and analyze it by using Panel data linear regression 
fixed-effect model on Eviews 7.0. 
, 
where ' ' refers to feature of online game portals and interceptor value of linear regression, while 
' ' refers to residual. We are going to show the result of fixed-effect model, because Hausman test 
rejected the hypothesis that there is random-effect. To avoid multi-co linearity problem, we do not 
include ‘number’ and ‘genre’ variable at the same time. Instead, either of two variables is alternatively 
analyzed. 
One may note that there is no price variable in the regression equation. The reason is the access to the 
online game platform is free. Furthermore, almost all games in Korea are free to use, i.e., users do not 
pay to play games.2 Instead, users pay for various game items. Since different games have different 
types of game items and moneys, we were not able to convert these charges into platform prices. Also, 
contrary to our original thought that there will be seasonality due to school vacations, there were no 
significant differences after Tramo/Seats seasonal adjustment. Hence we analyze the data without 
seasonal adjustments. 
 
                                              
2 Only a few exceptional games like World of Warcraft (WoW) ask users to pay for access. 
4.1.1 Platform market share  
Dependent variable is platform market share. The amount of online game portal usage can be 
measured by the traffic of either the number of unique visitors (UV) or total time spent by users (TTS). 
Because most online game portals have a structure to provide just an access to an individual game, UV 
may be a better proxy for our study. Therefore the platform market share is calculated based on UV. 
 
4.1.2 Number  
'Number' refers to the number of ties between complementors (games) and platform. It is measured by 
the number of games that can be played on online game portal 'i' at time 't'. 
 
4.1.3 Genre  
'Genre' is to see the qualitative aspect of complementors. This is measured by the number of game 
genres that can be played on online game portal 'i' at time 't'. Following the classification of genres in 
www.gametricks.com, we use 9 game genres such as FPS3, MMRPG4, RTS5, Gostop (Korean playing 
card game), Racing, Board, Sports, Arcade, and Poker. 
4.1.4 Rating  
'Rating' is measured by the average of age rating for games that are weighted by the population 
proportions. Suppose a portal provides game 1 for all ages, game 2 for age 12 and above, and game 3 
for age 18 and above. Since the population proportion of all ages, 12 and above, and 18 and above in 
Korea are 1, 0.94, and 0.85 respectively, the average Rating will be (1+0.94+0.85)/3 = 0.93. 
 
4.1.5 Overlap 
'Overlap' refers to the proportion of games which are in multi-homing contract that can be played on 
online game portal 'i' at time 't'. 
 
4.1.6 Status  
'Status' is to see the impact of connecting to the popular game developing firms. It is measured by the 
average market share of online game developers. High value of ‘Status' variable means an online 
                                              
3First-person shooter (FPS) is a video game genre centered on gun and projectile weapon-based combat through a first-person 
perspective; that is, the player experiences the action through the eyes of the protagonist.(source: Wikipedia) 
4Massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) is a genre of role-playing video games in which a very large 
number of players interact with one another within a virtual game world. (source: Wikipedia) 
5Real-time strategy (RTS) is a sub-genre of strategy video game which does not progress incrementally in turns. (source: 
Wikipedia) 
platform has contracts with popular developers. For instance, as of July 2009, in one platform 
www.plaync.co.kr, 90% were developed by NCsoft which has 5% game market share, and 10% were 
developed by others. Also, in online game developing industry, the market share of NCSoft is 5% and 
other companies are around 1%. In this case, 'Status' of www.plaync.co.kr becomes (0.05 * 0.9) + 
(0.01 * 0.1) = 0.046. 
 
4.1.7 Platform market share at time 't-1’ 
Although platform may not have direct network externalities, it might be possible that online game 
itself may have (Park 2008). Therefore, we use platform market share of the previous period, for the 
robustness check of our results in some regression equations.6  
 
4.2 Data 
Our data is panel for 14 online game portals for 34 months (from July 2009 to April 2012). However, 
one portal started to operate from September 2009, another one from November 2009, and the third 
one from October 2010. Including these three portals, the total number of observations is 523. We 
purchased the traffic data of online games from a marketing research company Nielsen- Korean Click. 
We also acquired other information such as the rank of games, genre, etc. from online game research 
company Game Tricks. We selected games serviced during this period, and online game portals in 
which users can play all games with only one ID. Since our dataset with 16 online game portals 
represent 95% of total online game portal market, there will be no sample selection bias. The 
descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of variables are follows. 
 
Number Genre Rating Overlap Status Age Market share 
Number 1.00  
Genre 0.87 1.00  
Rating -0.08 -0.05 1.00  
Overlap 0.54 0.56 -0.25 1.00  
Status 0.77 0.75 0.18 0.40 1.00  
Age 0.48 0.52 0.38 0.27 0.58 1.00 
Market share 0.78 0.62 0.02 0.30 0.52 0.57 1.00 
Mean 17.84 4.39 0.94 1.06 0.006 102.12 0.07 
Std. Dev. 17.16 2.58 0.03 0.07 0.002 39.78 0.08 
observations 523 523 523 523 523 523 523 
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics & Correlation Coefficients 
 
                                              
6 Even with ‘market share t-1’, however, there turned out to be no qualitative differences in our main results. 
5 RESULTS& DISCUSSION 
The regression results are shown in <Table 2>. We applied different combinations of variables to 
show the robustness of our results. In Model 1, 3, and 5, the coefficients of ‘number’ were positive and 
significant. Therefore, H1 was supported, i.e., the number of games on a platform that has positive 
impact on its market share. From the perspectives of two-sided market, we can claim that online game 
developers have positive indirect network effects on online gamers (users) through online game 
portals. 
While H1 is about quantitative measures, H2 and H3 were to see the qualitative aspects of online game 
titles such as the variety or generality. Contrary to our original thought, H2 was not significant. The 
variety of game genres on a platform did not have positive impacts on its market share. We think this 
result is due to the fact Korean online game market relied heavily on MMORPG genre, which takes 
about 60%. In other words, it can be assumed that most of online game portal market share is 
influenced by MMORPG. Although there was a report that online game users tend to be evenly spread 
across all genres recently compared with past,7 Korea is still MMORPG dominant society. Thus, 
providing various game genres did not have significant effects to increase number of gamers in an 
online game portal. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 



































































F 226.90*** 216.49*** 243.65*** 299.00*** 305.02*** 
                                              
7 http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=105&oid=029&aid=0000015199 
 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.93 
Dependent variable: platform market share 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, **, *** represent error rate 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Table 2.  Regression Results 
 
H3, which is to see the impact of generality, was not significantly positive either. In case of model 2, it 
was even significantly negative. This shows that although an online game portal increases its 
accessibility to more general age audiences, the effect is not necessarily good for the firm. We 
speculate this result as follows: Firstly, ages 18 and above are major customers in online game market, 
so the age restriction is not a big problem for users. According to the statistics from Korea Creative 
Contents Agency (2011), ages under 18 are only 15% of entire users. Secondly, gamers may prefer 
violence and sexuality, so that age restriction might oppositely affect the market. Because of this 
reason, online game developers provide more games for adult nowadays.8 
H4, which states that multi-homing has positive impact on a platform’s market share, was significant. 
In model 1 and 2, which did not consider the moderation effect of platform age, the variable ‘overlap’ 
was not significant. However, once we include the moderating variable, it became strongly significant 
and positive in all of model 3, 4, and 5. Therefore, if we simply look at the coefficient of overlap 
variable, the result was opposite of prior researches by Podlny and Stuart (1995), Tanriverdi and Lee 
(2008), and Srinivasan and Venkatraman (2010) since they insisted the negative impacts of multi-
homing. Contrarily, our result was closer to Choi (2010) that argued that multi-homing induces more 
consumers to the market. 
However, the interaction term of overlap and age were all significantly negative in model 3, 4, and 5. 
This means that the positive effect of multi-homing strategy on a platform market share completely 
reversed once the platform becomes mature. This result may happen by the following reasons. When a 
platform is a fledgling, it can attract users by providing games which already have reputation and 
many user bases. However, when platforms are mature, they don’t have extra customers to attract by 
providing multi-homing strategy. Instead, they may lose users to young platforms which utilize multi-
homing strategy. Abandoning effect becomes bigger than seizing effect for a mature platform. Hence 
H6 is supported. 
H5 is to see the impact of having relationship with popular online game developers. In model 2 
without the moderation effect, it was significantly positive. In a model with moderation effect, it was 
marginally significant (with 20% error rate) and positive in model 4. In other models, the coefficients 
of ‘status’ were not significant. Therefore, we can conclude that H5 is partially supported. This result 
implies that an online game portal may attract extra end users through the contracts with popular game 
developers to increase the centrality of the network position. Nevertheless, this impact is marginal.  
Regarding other control variables in the regression model, the age variable was significantly negative. 
This means that being a mature online game platform does not guarantee the market position of online 
game portals. Online gamers easily switch to other platforms if other conditions are better. Finally, the 
previous period of online game platform market share was significant and positive, which may imply 
that online game portals have direct network externality caused by install-based online games. The 
following table summarizes the results of hypotheses tests. 
 
                                              
8http://www.etnews.com/news/contents/game/2562342_1489.html 
 Hypothesis  
H1 The number of games on a platform has positive impact on its market share. Supported 
H2 The variety of game genre on a platform has positive impact on its market share. Not supported 
H3 The greater the number of younger user who can legally play games on a platform, the bigger its market share will be. 
Not 
supported 
H4 The greater the number of games which can be played on more than one platform, the larger the platform market share will be. Supported 
H5 Having relationship with popular online game developers will increase the market share of an online platform. 
Partially 
supported 
H6 Platform age has negative moderation effects on H4. Supported 
Table 3. Summary of the Hypotheses Tests 
 
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In Korean online game industry, by referring to the result of hypotheses, we can conclude that the 
diversity of games categorized into genre[+], rating[-] has no significant effects on online game 
platform market share. Also, 'status'[+]which refers to centrality of online game developing companies 
is partially supported. Contrarily, the number of game[+] is significant, and the multi-homing[+] is 
significantly affect the market share of online game portal. The interaction effect[-] between platform 
age and 'overlap' or multi-homing is significant.  
We derive the academic contributions of this study as follows. Korean online game industry has two-
sided market characteristic with low switching costs. Therefore, unlike other two-sided market studies 
that needed to consider (or should have considered) lock-in effects, our results show the pure indirect 
network externalities from game developers to gamers. This is the biggest contribution of our paper. 
The multi-homing results are not conforming to other IS studies because it depends on the maturity of 
the platform.   
Our study also has practical implications for online game firms. In June 2012, NCsoft, one of the 
biggest online game developers was merged by Nexon, the number one online game portal. Although 
NCsoft had very popular online game such as Lineage series and AION, its online game portal 
www.plaync.com was not so successful due to the lack of variety of games. On the other hand, Nexon 
became the biggest online game portal by providing various and powerful genre games through 
publishing contacts with many developers. Therefore, the merger brings more customer bases for 
NCsoft as well as more complement games for Nexon.   
The limitations of this study are as follows: Firstly, our dependent variable was the unique number of 
visitors (UV). This variable may not fully reflect the true market share of online game markets 
because it was not possible to measure how long users play games and how much they pay. Secondly, 
we were able to study the uni-direction of the two-sided market. In other words, what we investigated 
in this paper was the impact of the relationship between developers and platform on end users 
(gamers). The other direction, the impact of the relationship between gamers and platform on 
developers was not meaningfully investigated due to the data problem of developer side. In fact, we 
used the number of developers as a dependent variable and the market share of platform as an 
independent variable. The result of the regression turned out to be not significant. However, we don’t 
believe this is the evidence that there is no network effect in this direction. Game developers in Korea, 
especially small sized developers, cannot choose the platforms because platforms want to control the 
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